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Loki’s Wager and Laudan’s Error
On Genuine and Territorial Demarcation
Maarten  Boudry
Is the demarcation problem dead, or are the rumors of its demise greatly 
exaggerated? ! e answer depends on whom you ask. Some philosophers of 
science have voiced the opinion that the demarcation project has been some-
thing of an embarrassment to their discipline and that terms like “pseudo-
science” and “nonscience” should be erased from our philosophical vocabu-
lary, wedded as they are to a naïve conception of science and its borderlines. 
Nowadays philosophy of science has recovered somewhat from this backlash 
against demarcation. In the wake of a growing consensus that there is no silver 
bullet to separate science from nonscience, philosophers have shi" ed their at-
tention to more sophisticated ways of characterizing science and distinguish-
ing it from di# erent shades of nonscience (Nickles 2006; Hansson 2008, 2009; 
Pigliucci 2010).
! e major trouble with the demarcation project, as I argue in this chapter, 
is that it has traditionally been the banner of two distinct but o" en con$ ated 
intellectual projects, only one of which is pressing and worth pursuing. ! e 
genuine demarcation problem as I see it—the one with real teeth—deals with 
distinguishing bona % de science from pseudoscience. ! e second brand of 
demarcationism concerns the territorial boundaries separating science from 
such epistemic endeavors as philosophy, history, metaphysics, and even ev-
eryday reasoning.
I argue that the territorial problem has little epistemic import, su# ers from 
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additional categorization problems, and consequently neither calls nor allows 
for anything more than a pragmatic and rough-and-ready solution. ! e nor-
mative demarcation project, by contrast, although it too has resisted a simple 
solution (i.e., a small set of necessary and su"  cient conditions), is eminently 
worthy of philosophical attention, not only because it carries real epistemic 
import and practical urgency, but also because—fortunately—it happens to 
be a tractable problem. I discuss how both “demarcation” projects relate to 
one another and how they have o# en gotten mixed up. In particular, some 
have rashly proclaimed the death of the normative problem by performing 
an autopsy on the territorial problem (e.g., Laudan 1983), while others have 
tried to rescue the former by inadvertently resuscitating the latter (e.g., Pen-
nock 2011).
Normative and Territorial Demarcation
To retrace the sources of confusion over the nature of the demarcation prob-
lem, it is instructive to go back to its most famous formulation. In his attempt 
to tackle the problem of induction, Popper initially introduced the principle 
of falsi$ ability as a neutral and territorial touchstone to separate science from 
other forms of knowledge. ! us, in the Logic of Scienti! c Discovery ([1959] 
2002), originally published in German in 1934, he describes his falsi$ ability 
criterion as a way to distinguish “between the empirical sciences on the one 
hand, and mathematics and logic as well as ‘metaphysical systems’ on the 
other” (Popper [1959] 2002, 11). Obviously Popper does not dismiss logic 
and mathematics, but neither does he reject metaphysics outright. Indeed, 
he takes issue with the “derogatory evaluation” of metaphysics by the logical 
positivists, who famously equated it with meaningless twaddle.
In his later writings, however, the criterion of falsi$ ability takes on a more 
normative dimension. In Conjectures and Refutations, Popper ([1963] 2002) 
writes that he was troubled by the unfalsi$ able character of psychoanalytic 
doctrines propounded by Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, and of certain 
versions of Marxist theory, comparing them unfavorably with the empirical 
boldness of Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity. But even so, Popper 
grants that psychoanalysis may contain valuable insights, even if it has not 
achieved scienti$ c status (yet): “I personally do not doubt that much of what 
they say is of considerable importance, and may well play its part one day in a 
psychological science which is testable” (it isn’t, and it didn’t) (Popper [1963] 
2002, 49).
C6194.indb   80 2/25/13   1:42:42 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
 Loki’s Wager and Laudan’s Error 81
Although falsi! cationism was initially framed in neutral and territorial 
terms, most of its proponents have followed the lead of the later Popper, wield-
ing his yardstick to beat bad science and “pseudoscience” (an intrinsically pe-
jorative term, Nickles 2006; see also Nickles, chapter 6, in this volume). " is 
normative demarcation, like many other philosophical distinctions, does not 
yield to a simple solution (viz. one silver bullet to put an end to all nonsense), 
but as I argue below, that hardly means the problem is insoluble. Not only is 
the normative demarcation project alive and kicking (witness this volume), 
despite repeated assertions to the contrary, but Popper’s virtue of empirical 
riskiness is still a key to solving the problem.
Still, what about Popper’s territorial ambitions? " e problem that initially 
puzzled him was how to distinguish science from domains of knowledge that, 
though valuable in their own right, belong to a di# erent epistemic domain. 
What is the proper realm of science, and where exactly do we cross the border 
to philosophy or metaphysics, or even everyday reasoning? Territorial demar-
cation issues such as these, however, should be kept apart from the normative 
demarcation problem. Whereas territorial demarcation is concerned with 
a classi! cation of knowledge, or a division of labor between di# erent disci-
plines, and not with epistemic warrant per se (unless one holds that philoso-
phy or metaphysics cannot o# er knowledge at all), normative demarcation 
adjudicates between theories or practices we should rationally accept and 
those to which we should not grant any credence.
Even if the territorial borders are untraceable, as I think they are, this 
need not a# ect normative demarcation project. Before returning to the lat-
ter problem, let me gesture at some of the reasons why I think the territorial 
brand of demarcationism is philosophically sterile. On the one hand, there 
is o$ en no way to disentangle philosophical elements from scienti! c theo-
ries and arguments. In philosophy, abstract reasoning and logic take the fore-
ground, whereas in science, the emphasis is on empirical data and hypothesis 
testing. But scienti! c theories invariably rest upon certain philosophical un-
derpinnings, and science without abstract reasoning and logical inferences is 
just stamp-collecting. As Daniel Dennett succinctly put it, “there is no such 
thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical 
baggage is taken on board without examination” (Dennett 1996, 21). On the 
other hand, good philosophical theories should be maximally informed by the 
relevant scienti! c knowledge and o$ en derive support from scienti! c ! ndings 
(philosophy of mind from neuroscience, philosophy of science from cogni-
tive psychology and sociology, etc.).1 In more and more contemporary philo-
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sophical discussions, logical reasoning and empirical evidence are so inextri-
cably intertwined as to make demarcation e! orts pointless and unrewarding. 
In light of this entangled relation, philosophers in the tradition of naturalism, 
which has been gaining in" uence over the past decades, maintain that phi-
losophy and science are cut from the same cloth (e.g., Laudan 1990; Haack 
2007). # is approach does not see one discipline as prior to or wholly distinct 
from the other, but considers both as interdependent and continuous.2
In a similar vein, naturalistic epistemologists have argued that science is 
continuous with everyday reasoning. Modern science is a highly complex and 
di! erentiated social endeavor, but the practice of hypothesis testing and am-
pliative reasoning underlying science is already apparent in everyday reason-
ing (e.g., tracking animals, $ xing a car). None of the characteristic features of 
modern science—the use of sophisticated technical equipment, formalization 
and mathematical tools, the system of peer review and public presentations, 
the years of formal training and practice—detach scienti$ c reasoning from 
everyday knowledge acquisition. # e complex institutional organization and 
systematic methodology of science can be seen as a highly re$ ned and sophis-
ticated extension of everyday reasoning, re" ecting a heightened awareness 
of human cognitive foibles and a preoccupation with di%  cult, cutting-edge 
questions of a more theoretical nature.
In sum, though it may certainly be convenient for pragmatic purposes 
to distinguish science from philosophy or everyday reasoning, (i) such ter-
ritorial demarcation carries nothing like the epistemic weight attached to the 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience, and (ii) unlike the latter 
project, territorial demarcation is complicated by the problems of interde-
pendence and continuity.
! e Demarcation of What?
Even if territorial demarcation is fruitless, as I think it is, this does not af-
fect the viability of the normative demarcation between science and pseudo-
science. In his (in)famous obituary of “the” demarcation project, however, 
Larry Laudan con" ates the two kinds of demarcation, dismissing the concept 
of pseudoscience by dwelling on complications pertaining to territorial de-
marcation. Laudan (1983, 118) starts o!  by describing the demarcation proj-
ect as an e! ort to “identify those epistemic or methodological features which 
mark o!  science from other sorts of belief,” suggesting a neutral distinction 
between types of beliefs. But he then challenges the demarcation criterion 
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of “well-testedness”—a clearly normative criterion—by listing several forms 
of knowledge that, although certainly well tested in his view, belong to “con-
ventionally nonscienti! c ! elds” (Laudan 1983, 123) (e.g., singular historical 
claims, military strategies, literary theory, etc.). Laudan makes much of this 
perceived problem, and for the territorial demarcationist it may be trouble-
some indeed, but it is hardly what keeps the philosopher of pseudoscience 
awake at night. Laudan seems to assume that the two projects form a package 
deal, alternately shi" ing from the former to the latter and seeing all of the 
associated problems as equally damaging to a single “demarcation project.” 
# is attitude is apparent in his way of dealing with past demarcation attempts. 
First, Laudan dismisses Popper’s falsi! cationism as a “toothless wonder” be-
cause it accords scienti! c status to falsi! able but blatantly false claims, such 
as the claim that the earth is six thousand years old. Because it fails to per-
form the “critical stable-cleaning chores for which it was originally intended” 
(1983, 122), according to Laudan, it is a “disaster.” In fact, the problem is 
rather trivial and can be remedied even within a falsi! cationist framework. To 
give the Popperian demarcation criterion some teeth, we need only require 
that, in addition to it being falsi! able, a theory must have survived repeated 
attempts at falsi! cation (the Popperian notion of “corroboration”). # e fact 
that young-earth creationism is technically “scienti! c” for a strict Popperian, 
in the sense that it is at least open to falsi! cation, even though having been 
conclusively falsi! ed, is a semantic nonissue. As we saw, however, the crite-
rion of “well-testedness,” the next shot in Laudan’s historical review of de-
marcationism, ! nds no mercy with him either, this time precisely because it 
would count as scienti! c such—dixit Laudan—patently nonscienti! c claims 
as “Bacon did not write the plays attributed to Shakespeare.” But obviously 
a demarcation project that would succeed in excluding such well-tested, his-
torical claims from science would inevitably be another of those “toothless 
wonder[s]” (122) that Laudan decries in the ! rst place (one wonders how 
Laudan recognizes a patently nonscienti! c claim, if he does not believe in any 
form of demarcationism). By demanding that the demarcation problem both 
is and is not normatively discriminating, Laudan wants to have his cake and 
eat it too.
Science and the Supernatural
In recent years, some philosophers and scientists have countered religious 
pseudoscience by wielding a demarcation criterion that is a confusing blend 
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of territorial and normative elements. According to this principle of “method-
ological naturalism,” science is inherently limited to providing natural expla-
nations for the natural world, and it does not (nor can) tra!  c in supernatural 
claims. By this standard, theories like Intelligent Design (ID) creationism are 
immediately ruled out as pseudoscience because of their covert or open reli-
ance on supernatural causes. For example, in an o!  cial booklet of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (1998, 124), we learn that
because science is limited to explaining the natural world by means of natural 
processes, it cannot use supernatural causation in its explanations. Similarly, 
science is precluded from making statements about supernatural forces be-
cause these are outside its provenance.
Although it is primarily directed against pseudoscience, this natural/super-
natural distinction also has territorial overtones. It exorcises questions about 
a broader picture of the world (e.g., Does God play any role in the universe? 
Is evolution blind or goal directed?) from science and relegates them to the 
domain of philosophy (Pennock 1999, 2011; Sober 2010).
Robert Pennock, in a paper defending methodological naturalism as a 
“ground rule” and “ballpark de" nition” of science (see also Fales, chapter 13, 
in this volume), starts out with rightly rebuking Laudan’s view that the demar-
cation project is dead (see also Pigliucci, chapter 1, in this volume): “to hold 
that there is no di# erence between science and pseudo-science is to abandon 
any claim of insight into the analysis of knowledge or questions about distin-
guishing the real from the deceptive” (Pennock 2011, 195). Pennock gives a 
number of solid arguments for the viability of normative demarcation, but 
his defense of methodological naturalism quickly slips into territorial waters. 
$ is can be gleaned from Pennock’s claim that science remains “scrupulously 
neutral” on the existence of supernatural entities (Pennock 2011, 188). God 
may well exist, but science has no business with him.
$ e appeal of methodological naturalism as a territorial demarcation is 
twofold. On the one hand, it gets rid of pseudosciences such as creationism 
and ID theory in one fell swoop. On the other hand, it makes science meta-
physically innocuous, safeguarding a special domain for supernatural specu-
lation where science is impotent, and thus establishing a modus vivendi be-
tween science and religion.3 Alas, the solution su# ers from several problems.
First, it provides a disservice to both science and philosophy. By strug-
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gling over the proper borderlines of science, this solution fuels the common 
misconception that only “science” possesses epistemic authority, whereas 
metaphysical questions, traditionally the trade of philosophers, are a matter 
of idle speculation only, which, interesting though it may be, can be safely 
ignored in scienti! c matters.
Second, given that the very concept of the supernatural is notoriously 
vague and elusive, it is ill advised to erect any form of demarcation on its 
shoulders. To give substance to such a territorial demarcation claim, one 
needs to come up with a coherent and nontrivial de! nition of natural versus 
supernatural that does not already presuppose the demarcation between sci-
ence and nonscience. Pennock, for his part, argues that anyone who thinks 
that supernatural hypotheses may have testable consequences has “illegiti-
mately [assumed] naturalized notions of the key terms or other naturalized 
background assumptions” (Pennock 2011, 189). But Pennock simply equates 
testability and naturalness and leaves us with a circular and self-serving de! ni-
tion of supernatural as that which is beyond scienti! c investigation by de! ni-
tion: “if we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural pow-
ers, then, by de! nition, they would not be supernatural” (Pennock 1999, 290; 
see also Pennock 2011; Boudry et al. 2010a; Tanona 2010). Such a de! nitional 
shortcut would not even recognize most religious miracle stories as super-
natural, nor would it be helpful in dealing with typical pseudosciences. For 
example, if the claims of extrasensory perception (ESP) and telepathy were 
borne out, would we be dealing with supernatural phenomena or just elusive 
and poorly understood natural ones? Do aliens use advanced technology or 
spooky spiritual powers, as ufologists sometimes suggest? Whom do we con-
sult to settle such matters? I argue that we need not make up our minds about 
these questions before deciding whether parapsychology or ufology are pseu-
doscienti! c (see below).
" ird, if supernatural forces were operating in the natural world, pro-
ducing tangible empirical consequences, as many theists maintain, nothing 
would prevent scientists from empirically investigating those.4 As I have ar-
gued elsewhere (Boudry, Blancke, and Braeckman 2010a), narrowing down 
the scope of science by excluding all supernatural claims from its purview is 
unfeasible and historically inaccurate, given that many such claims have in 
fact been subjected to empirical investigations (e.g., the healing power of 
intercessory prayer, clairvoyance, communication with angels). Upon any 
nontrivial de! nition of the term “supernatural,” I see no sound reason why 
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supernatural phenomena would be intrinsically beyond the pale of science 
(see Fales, chapter 13, in this volume).
Fourth, and most important for this chapter, the territorial move bypasses 
the real reason for the dismal epistemic status of ID creationism, which is that 
it exhibits more general telltale signs of pseudoscience: ID theorists refuse 
to ! esh out their design hypothesis and use convenient immunizations that 
make the theory impervious to criticism; the concepts devised by ID advo-
cates su" er from equivocations that turn their central argument into a moving 
target; the theory is too vague to allow for speci# c predictions and to achieve 
any form of genuine explanatory uni# cation; ID proponents refuse to get into 
the details of the mechanism and method used by the designer; the bulk of ID 
literature consists of purely negative arguments against evolution, with the 
sole purpose of distorting science and sowing doubt; and so on.
$ e label “supernatural” is a red herring in this context because the kinds 
of problems listed above are neither exclusive nor intrinsic to supernatural 
hypotheses. In fact, all of them should sound familiar to anyone who has wan-
dered into the strange hinterlands of science before (Fishman 2009). In the 
next section, I give examples of perfectly naturalistic doctrines that are guilty 
of precisely the same sins (particularly regarding testability and immuniza-
tion), which shows that the proponents of “methodological naturalism” as a 
weapon against ID creationism are barking up the wrong tree.
! e Revenge of Demarcationism
How does science secure epistemic warrant? No matter how we # ll in the de-
tails, it should be clear that many things can go wrong in many di" erent ways. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that the category of pseudoscience (or 
bad science) is heterogeneous, resisting explication in terms of necessary and 
su%  cient conditions (Nickles 2006, 194). In the skeptical literature, the term 
“pseudo science” refers to nonscience posing or masquerading as genuine 
science. To capture this intuitive conception, Hansson (2009; see also Hans-
son, chapter 4, in this volume) o" ers the following helpful characterization of 
pseudoscience:
1. It pertains to an issue within the domains of science (in the wide sense).
2. It is not epistemically warranted.
3. It is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impres-
sion that it is epistemically warranted.
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What is valuable about Hansson’s approach is that it brackets our justi! ca-
tions for belief in real science and focuses on the general characterization of 
 pseudoscience ! rst. Despite the conceptual heterogeneity of “pseudoscience,” 
Hansson’s provision (2009, 240) that its proponents “try to create the impres-
sion that [their theory] is epistemically warranted” gives us good reason to ex-
pect some shared characteristics. In the absence of the epistemic warrant that 
genuine science accrues, pseudosciences are confronted with the problem of 
surviving the day when prophecy fails and of creating a spurious impression 
of epistemic warrant. Bona ! de science is not confronted with that problem. 
If you have nature on your side, so to speak, you can a" ord to be receptive to 
her judgment, which is precisely what we value—among other things—in suc-
cessful scienti! c theories. In order to survive the stern judgment of nature and 
the onslaught of critical arguments, however, pseudoscientists are forced to 
systematically evade falsi! cation and turn apparent refutations into spurious 
con! rmations.
# is is the reason why, despite the glaring problems with his naïve falsi-
! cationism, Popper was right to champion empirical boldness as a cardinal 
scienti! c virtue. For Popper, however, particularly in his later years, the fal-
si! ability of a theory is purely a function of its logical properties and conse-
quence relations (Hansson 2008). But ever since the seminal work of Pierre 
Duhem, we know that scienti! c theories are tested in bundles and never in 
isolation. A theory is not falsi! able until it is conjoined with background as-
sumptions, initial conditions, and auxiliary hypotheses. Depending on how 
we interpret Popper’s logical criterion in light of these problems, it is either 
too restrictive, classifying some of our best theories as nonscienti! c, or too 
permissive, allowing some of the worst theories in currency (e.g., astrology) 
to be recognized as science (Kitcher 1982). Popper’s disciple Imre Lakatos 
realized that every scienti! c “research programme” is protected against fal-
si! cation by a host of auxiliary hypotheses. It is simply not true, generally 
speaking, that scientists abandon a theory as soon as they have witnessed an 
anomalous observation. Instead, they have at their disposal various ways of 
tweaking and adjusting auxiliary hypotheses to preserve their central hypoth-
esis, some of which ways seem quite respectable.
Still, even a$ er taking into account Duhem’s problem of underdetermina-
tion and the complexities of science’s historical development, the virtue of 
empirical boldness in science emerges unscathed. In particular, we still need 
some restrictions on the amount of gerrymandering that we can allow in the 
face of apparent refutations (Leplin 1975). One of the hallmarks of pseudosci-
C6194.indb   87 2/25/13   1:42:42 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
88 Maarten Boudry
ence, as Kitcher (1982, 48) succinctly puts it, is that it has “too cozy a relation-
ship with auxiliary hypotheses,” applying its problem-solving strategies with 
“claims that can be ‘tested’ only in their applications,” in other words, that are 
purely ad hoc and not independently testable.
True enough, contrary to Popper’s stringent falsi! cationist ideals, scien-
tists do not just abandon their theory the moment they encounter a single 
apparent falsi! cation. But no theorist can remain comfortable when running 
slap up against reality time and again. People may believe crazy things on 
" imsy grounds, but they will not buy into anything at any price (Boudry and 
Braeckman 2012). A super! cial ring of plausibility is a psychological sine qua 
non for every successful pseudoscience. Such an impression of epistemic war-
rant is generally created by (i) minimized risk of refutation, (ii) phony appear-
ance of empirical boldness, or (iii) opportunities for “con! rmations” without 
actual threat of refutation. Strategies for pulling o#  such sleights of mind recur 
across the pseudoscienti! c domain. I present a rough typology—a tentative 
“nosology of human thought,” as David Stove (1991, 187) puts it—that I have 
discussed in more detail elsewhere (Boudry and Braeckman 2011, 2012).
Multiple Endpoints and Moving Targets
By using conceptual equivocations and what psychologists have labeled 
“multiple endpoints” (i.e., multiple ways in which a claim may be borne 
out), pseudoscientists create an asymmetry between observations capable 
of  con! rming and those that could refute a given hypothesis. In the case of 
conceptual equivocation, which is pervasive in astrology and doomsday pre-
dictions, one begins by endorsing a bold and strong interpretation of a claim 
but, when threatened with falsi! cation, switches to a weaker and broader in-
terpretation. In fact, typical psychic pronouncements are amenable both to 
a speci! c interpretation and a range of broader and more metaphorical ones 
(e.g. “a fatherly ! gure stands behind you”). Equivocations are also found in 
the creationist’s notion of biblical “kinds,” a concept that, according to Philip 
Kitcher (1982, 155), is “[tailored] to suit the needs of the moment” to preserve 
the claim that evolution between kinds is impossible. $ e latter-day heirs of 
creationism have applied the same bait-and-switch strategy in their argu-
ment that some biological systems are “irreducibly complex,” equivocating 
between a sound but trivial and an interesting but false version of the concept 
(Boudry et al. 2010b).
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Shadowy Retreats
A related way to steer clear of unwelcome evidence and criticism is to remain 
as vague and noncommittal about one’s hypothesis as possible. ID creationists 
steadfastly refuse to reveal anything about the mechanisms and procedures 
used by the alleged designer, insisting that his motives are inscrutable and 
that the whole a! air is beyond human comprehension (this, of course, being a 
traditional cop-out for theists). Note that this stalemate does not derive from 
the supernatural character of the hypothesis, as there is nothing that prevents 
ID creationists from " eshing out their design hypothesis in such a way that it 
actually yields speci# c predictions (Boudry and Leuridan 2011). Pseudosci-
enti# c beliefs in general are o$ en indeterminate and mysterious (e.g., healing 
crystals), which ensures that they are inaccessible to normal epistemic evalu-
ation (Sperber 1990), and that contradictions and adverse evidence will go 
largely unnoticed to believers.
Conspiracy ! inking
Conspiracy thinking is a doubly convenient strategy of immunization and 
spurious con# rmation. On the one hand, conspiracy theorists present any 
anomaly in the received view of some historical event as evidence of some-
thing secretive and sinister going on (Keeley 1999). On the other hand, anom-
alies for their own hypothesis can be explained away as being exactly what 
would be predicted on the conspiracy view. Evil conspirators, a$ er all, can be 
expected to spread forged evidence and disinformation to throw us o!  the 
scent. Moreover, the very existence of critical dissenters of the conspiracy 
view can be construed as further evidence for the belief system. In Freud-
ian psychoanalysis, for instance, which exhibits the same epistemic structure 
as a conspiracy theory (Crews 1986; Boudry and Buekens 2011), critics are 
suspected of being motivated by unconscious resistance and defense mecha-
nisms, exactly as predicted by the theory.
Invisible Escape Clauses
Many pseudoscientists appear to make bold empirical statements, but when 
push comes to shove, they resort to special escape clauses and get-out-of-jail-
free cards to forestall falsi# cation, thus dashing expectations initially engen-
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dered by their statements. Parapsychology is notoriously abundant with such 
escape clauses. Examples include the idea that the presence of inquisitive 
minds tends to disturb psychic phenomena, known as “negative psi vibra-
tion” or “catapsi” (for a skeptical discussion, see Humphrey 1996; Wiseman 
2010), or the argument that psi is “actively evasive” because its primary func-
tion is to “induce a sense of mystery and wonder” (Kennedy 2003, 67). Again, 
in a full-blown pseudoscience, such escape clauses are su!  ciently vague and 
noncommittal to be conveniently ignored as long as they are not needed. By 
qualifying apparent falsi" cations with such moves while accepting con" rma-
tions at face value, again an asymmetry is created between what can con" rm 
and refute a theory.
As should be clear by now, I think it is the resort to such ad hoc maneuvers and 
the refusal to # esh out one’s hypothesis that makes a theory like ID creation-
ism pseudoscienti" c, not the appeal to a “supernatural” cause per se (what-
ever that may mean). As Fishman (2009, 826) wrote, it is certainly possible for 
supernaturalists to resort to “ad hoc explanations for the absence of evidence 
or discon" rming evidence for the supernatural,” but exactly the same strat-
egy is open to defenders of mundane and perfectly natural claims. $ e more 
general and underlying problem is that “continued ad hoc rationalization of 
repeated bouts of contrary evidence betrays a commitment to preserve a de-
sired hypothesis at all cost” (Fishman 2009, 826).
Further Problems with Falsi! cationism
Laudan levels one strenuous objection against demarcationism that directly 
concerns the normative version of the problem, and we should now be able 
to put it to rest. According to Laudan, the charge of unfalsi" ability against 
creationism “egregiously confuses doctrines with the proponents of those 
doctrines” (1982, 17). Because it foists o%  unresponsiveness to falsi" cation on 
the theory itself, the argument con# ates ad hominem and ad argumentum. If 
creationists, astrologers, or Freudians are unmoved by repeated falsi" cations 
of their doctrines, this reveals something about their psychological makeup, 
but it does not impinge on the falsi" ability of their doctrines. Laudan’s com-
plaint was echoed by Philip Quinn (1996), Adolf Grünbaum (2008), Edward 
Erwin (1996), and a number of other philosophers, and ironically it is " rmly 
within the tradition of Popper’s strictly logicist analysis of propositions and 
their observational implications.
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But if Popper’s logicist approach is ill equipped to deal with real-life ex-
amples of genuine science, as has been shown by Duhem, Quine, Kuhn, and 
others, a fortiori it must fail in the swamps of pseudoscience. In many inter-
esting cases, among which the ones Popper himself discussed (e.g., Freudian 
psychoanalysis, astrology), there is typically no procedure for separating the 
theory-in-itself from the cognitive and methodological behavior of its defend-
ers (Cio!   1998; see also Cio!  , chapter 17, in this volume). " e upshot of 
this problem is that the philosopher of pseudoscience has no choice but to 
get involved in the sociology of the discipline at large, and the psychology 
of those who are engaged in it. Kitcher even goes as far as suggesting that the 
category of pseudoscience is “derivatively psychological,” in the sense that 
“pseudoscience is just what [pseudoscientists] do” (1993, 196). I think the 
truth lies somewhere in between. For example, when a parapsychologist at-
tributes a failed experiment to the disturbing vibes of skeptical observers, it 
is not clear whether this is just methodological misdemeanor on the part of 
the parapsychologist, or whether it follows from his adherence to a standard 
tenet of parapsychology (the “catapsi” e# ect). When an ID creationist juggles 
with an ambiguous concept like “kind” or “irreducible complexity,” there is 
no way of telling where the proper theory ends and where the obfuscations 
by its defenders begin. No one has come up with a general procedure to settle 
such matters.5
In many cases, immunizing strategies have such a cozy relationship with a 
pseudoscienti$ c doctrine that they are at least provoked by it. For some para-
psychologists, the elusive and shy nature of psi is one of the central tenets of 
the doctrine, so that the practice of cherry picking experiments with positive 
outcomes can be given a sensible theoretical rationalization. To take another 
example, Freudian psychoanalysis uses a host of methodological principles 
and concepts to in% ate the inferential possibilities of psychoanalytic interpre-
tation, the cumulative e# ect of which is that it is hard to imagine any form of 
human behavior that would be at odds with the theory (this was Popper’s cor-
rect intuition). But the use of such methodological licenses and conceptual 
wildcards is no accidental quirk of some psychoanalyst interpreters: it simply 
re% ects Freud’s division of the mind into unobservable and antagonistic enti-
ties, and his rich account of the purposeful mental interactions between those 
systems (negation, substitution, condensation, reaction formation, inver-
sion, repression, etc.) (Cio!   1998; see also Cio!  , chapter 17, in this volume; 
Boudry and Buekens 2011).6
" e problem with Laudan’s and Günbaum’s approach is that, although 
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nothing in Freudian psychoanalysis or parapsychology strictly dictates such 
fallacious forms of reasoning, their pervasiveness becomes intelligible only 
when we consider the belief system in which they are embedded. In short, the 
entanglement of theory and psychology forces us to widen our scope beyond 
the propositional content and logical structure of pseudosciences.
Setting Out the Borders
Although I have argued that Laudan is wrong and that the normative demar-
cation problem is tractable, this does not mean no borderline cases exist. In 
particular, epistemic warrant is not constant over time, so theories may move 
in and out of the domain of science as new evidence accumulates and con-
ceptual progress is made (Hansson 2009; see also Ruse, chapter 12, in this 
volume). A twilight zone does exist, with theories that are neither scienti! c 
nor quite pseudoscienti! c, but we can readily come up with clear instances 
of both kinds, which is all that is needed for the viability of the normative de-
marcation project (Pigliucci 2010). By contrast, I have argued that, in most in-
teresting cases, demarcating science and philosophy or science and everyday 
reasoning is like distinguishing the " our and sugar in a piece of cake (maybe 
feasible, but not very rewarding). # e mutual interdependence and conti-
nuity that complicates territorial demarcation, making it a largely unfruitful 
endeavor, is completely absent from normative demarcation. No genuine sci-
ence depends on pseudoscience for its justi! cation.7 In fact, there are analo-
gous normative problems in each of the “territories” neighboring science that 
I think deserve more attention than the territorial demarcation per se: which 
theories deserve to be called good philosophy, and which are merely vacuous 
pseudophilosophy? How to distinguish rigorous mathematics from pseudo-
mathematical verbiage? What is the di$ erence between insightful hermeneu-
tics and pseudohermeneutics?
Indeed, the normative demarcation criterion arguably cuts across territo-
rial borders, with, for example, pseudosciences and pseudohistory exhibiting 
shared features that make them more similar to one another than to, respec-
tively, bona ! de science and good historiography. # e normative demarcation 
question in historical science concerns whether and how we can distinguish 
bona ! de historiography from what David Aaronovitch (2010) has termed 
“voodoo history,” such as unsubstantiated conspiracy theories about major 
historical events. # e cavalier approach to empirical evidence among conspir-
acy theorists and their systematic use of ad hoc explanations bear uncanny 
C6194.indb   92 2/25/13   1:42:42 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
 Loki’s Wager and Laudan’s Error 93
resemblances to the strategies of “pseudoscientists.” To the extent that one 
views history as part of science broadly construed, the received account of the 
Holocaust deserves to be called “scienti! c,” whereas Holocaust negationism 
certainly does not. Although the methodological di" erences between experi-
mental and historical sciences make for fascinating philosophical discussions 
(Cleland 2002; see also Cleland and Brindell, chapter 10, in this volume), it 
seems that what distinguishes nuclear physics from cold fusion theory, and 
Second World War history from Holocaust denial, is an epistemic issue of an 
altogether di" erent order.
# e same can be maintained when it comes to philosophy. For example, 
conceptual equivocation is as pernicious in philosophy as it is in science, and 
the self-protective rationale is exactly the same (Law 2011). # e philosopher 
André Kukla has complained about the systematic vacillation in the social 
constructivist literature between strong and weak versions of a claim, coining 
the terms “switcheroos” and “reverse-switcheroos” to describe these “philo-
sophical sins” (Kukla 2000, x). Nicholas Shackel has similarly analyzed the 
strategy of equivocation in postmodernist philosophy:
Having it both ways is essential to the appeal of postmodernism, for it is pre-
cisely by apparently speaking simultaneously of two di" erent concepts with 
the same word that the appearance of giving a profound but subtle analysis of a 
taken-for-granted concept is created. (Shackel 2005, 304)
# ese discussions illustrate that philosophers are facing a normative de-
marcation task in their own discipline. Indeed, the fuzzy borders between 
philosophy and science, and the commonalities of their respective pseudo-
counterparts, further downplay the territorial demarcation problem. Phi-
losophers and scientists alike should join e" orts to separate the wheat from 
the cha"  in both domains rather than staking their own territorial borders. 
As Massimo Pigliucci writes, one of the most fruitful interactions between 
science and philosophy consist of the “joint defense against the assault from 
pseudoscienti! c quarters” (2008, 11).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have expressed little con! dence in the viability of the ter-
ritorial demarcation problem, and even less interest in solving it. Not only 
is there no clear-cut way to disentangle epistemic domains like science and 
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philosophy, but such a distinction carries little epistemic weight. ! e demar-
cation problem that deserves our attention is the one between science and 
pseudoscience (and the analogous ones between philosophy and pseudo-
philosophy and between history and pseudohistory). Separating the wheat 
from the cha"  in these disciplines is a problem with both epistemic import 
and practical urgency, particularly in the face of relentless attempts by vari-
ous people—practitioners of alternative medicine, creationists of di" erent 
stripes, parapsychologists—to claim scienti# c respectability. Naïve falsi# ca-
tionism has been widely (and wisely) abandoned in philosophy of science, 
but the value of bold theorizing, broadly construed as hospitability to critical 
evaluation, remains intact both in science and philosophy. Instead of hanker-
ing for a silver bullet of demarcation, desirable though such a tool would be, 
we have no choice but to get down in the trenches and engage ourselves with 
the claims and arguments of pseudoscientists, scrutinizing their doctrines 
carefully and pointing out speci# c fallacies.
ID creationism invokes supernatural entities and is guilty of a host of 
pseudo scienti# c sins, but the two issues should not be con$ ated. Because we 
have become so accustomed to supernaturalists falling for the pseudoscience 
trap, and because we have grown weary of creationist hypotheses that, when 
push comes to shove, boil down to “God did it and his ways are mysterious,” 
we can hardly imagine any other supernatural hypothesis to be viable (the 
prospects, admittedly, are extremely bleak). But even if all current theories 
with property X happen to be pseudoscienti# c, this does not mean that talk of 
X is o"  limits. In this case, it may simply tell us a great deal about the (contin-
gent) absence of evidence for supernatural phenomena and about the wide-
spread psychological attachment to the supernatural in spite of this absence.
! e appropriate way of dealing with a supernaturalist pseudoscience like 
ID creationism is not to relegate it to a domain where science has no author-
ity, but to confront the conceptual and empirical problems of the theory head 
on. In that respect, Laudan is completely on the mark when he writes that 
“our focus should be squarely on the empirical and conceptual credentials for 
claims about the world” (1983, 125). But Laudan (as well as Popper) was wide 
of the mark when he reduced the demarcation job to evaluating the proposi-
tional content of the theory. In the murky hinterland of science, such a neat 
distinction between the theory-as-such and the way it is handled by its advo-
cates is invariably hard to come by. Pseudoscience is too messy to be analyzed 
on the level of the theory-in-itself, and demarcationists need more re# ned 
instruments of analysis.
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! omas Paine once wrote that “it is error only, and not truth, that shrinks 
from inquiry.” Because pseudoscience is propagated in the face of reason and 
empirical evidence (otherwise it would presumably be epistemically war-
ranted), it engages in systematic attempts to dodge falsi" cation and criticism, 
to give a spurious appearance of empirical boldness that is always belatedly 
disappointed, and to twist apparent falsi" cations into con" rmations. If a 
theoretical endeavor pretends to be science while it exhibits these and other 
epistemic sins to a su#  ciently egregious extent, don’t we need some word 
to capture it and distinguish it from bona " de science? If Laudan thinks that 
“pseudoscience” is just a “hollow phrase” (1983, 125), does he have a better 
term in store?
In Norse mythology, the trickster god Loki once made a bet with the 
dwarfs, on the condition that, should he lose, the dwarfs would cut o$  his 
head. Sure enough, Loki lost his bet, and the dwarfs came to collect his pre-
cious head. But Loki protested that, while they had every right to take his 
head, the dwarfs should not touch any part of his neck. All the parties in-
volved discussed the matter: some parts obviously belonged to the neck, and 
others were clearly part of Loki’s head, but still other parts were disputable. 
Agreement was never reached, and Loki ended up keeping both head and 
neck. In argumentation theory, Loki’s Wager is known as the unreasonable 
insistence that some term cannot be de" ned and therefore cannot be subject 
of discussion. In this chapter, I hope to have shown that denunciating the nor-
mative demarcation project is an instance of Loki’s Wager, while quarreling 
with territorial demarcation is not.
Notes
1. Quine famously tried to dissolve the analytic/synthetic distinction on which many 
would want to erect the boundaries between science and philosophy. But one need not buy 
into Quine’s argument to question territorial demarcation.
2 .! ere are di$ erent ways of partitioning this broader domain of knowledge. ! e Ger-
man word Wissenscha!  encompasses both the natural sciences and historical disciplines, 
whereas “science” is usually taken to refer more narrowly to the natural sciences. ! e more 
expansive domain of “empirically informed knowledge” that encompasses both science and 
philosophy was coined “scientia” by the philosopher of science William Whewell.
3. Not all those who defend methodological naturalism are friendly for religion. Pigliucci 
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(2011) for example argues that supernaturalism is incoherent and hence “not even wrong,” 
which is hardly a cause of comfort to the religious.
4. Of course, it is true that God is nowhere to be found in science textbooks and in the 
technical literature, and modern scientists clearly eschew supernatural explanations. ! ere 
is good inductive ground for doing so because appeals to the supernatural have always 
turned out to be premature in the past, and the scienti" c naturalization of the world has been 
relentless and one-directional. ! e mistake of territorialists is to retrospectively translate the 
contingent outcome of scienti" c progress into self-imposed methodological strictures.
5. ! is o# en leads to the seemingly contradictory claim that Freudian psychoanalysis is 
both unfalsi" able and falsi" ed: to the extent that we can isolate speci" c hypotheses and disen-
tangle them from the rest of Freudian doctrine, such hypotheses may be falsi" ed.
6. Notoriously, the conception of a deceitful and manipulative unconscious gives rise 
to a form of conspiracy theorizing, in which any form of contrary evidence can be interpreted 
as arising from unconscious resistance to psychoanalytic insights (even the “hostility” of 
critics).
7. Pseudoscience o# en feeds on real science, if only as a template to imitate. Also note 
that I do not deny that pseudoscientists may make serendipitous discoveries.
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